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How Field v. Google Could Affect Fair Use
Analysis in the Internet Age
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is hard to believe that just fifteen or twenty years ago, most people did
not even own a computer, much less use the Internet on a daily basis. Today,
the Internet touches every facet of life. With the rise of the vast wealth of
information available on the Internet, there is a need for an efficient way to
find and use that information. Companies such as Google, Yahoo, Microsoft,
and others have rushed to fill that need through their popular search engines.
As these new areas of technology develop, legal and policy issues also
emerge - especially in the area of intellectual property law. On the one side,
it is clear that society increasingly demands more efficient and effective ways
to harness the power of the Internet. On the other side many artists, writers,
and inventors argue that this new technology is trampling upon their intellec-
tual property rights.
This case note will focus on the potential impact that a new federal
district court case, Field v. Google,' is likely to have in this emerging area of
Internet intellectual property law. This note argues that the court correctly
decided the issue and that its analysis of implied licenses and the "transform-
ative" nature of search engines will likely open the way for the growth of not
only search engines, but also major initiatives such as the Google Library
Project.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Field v. Google involved an attorney/poet who claimed that Google's
"cached" copies of his poetry website constituted copyright infringement of
his exclusive property rights in the poetry.2,3 In an effort to manufacture a
claim against Google, Field created a website of his poetry which was free
and open to the public, then deliberately set the technical parameters for his
site to allow Google's search engine to index and make a "cached" copy of
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1. Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
2. Id. at 1110.
3. A "cached" copy of a website is essentially a digital snapshot of that website at
a particular moment in time. See Google Webmaster Help Center-Remove
cached pages, http://www.google.con/remove.htm.
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his site.4,5 After Google users visited the cached copies of his website, Field
claimed that by making a cached copy of his site and giving the public access
to that copy, Google infringed on his exclusive rights to reproduce and dis-
tribute copies of his poetry. 6 After an extensive discussion of the values of
search engines to society, the court concluded that Google's cached copies of
Field's website did not infringe on Field's copyrights, and held that: 1)
Google held an implied license to use the material; 2) Field was estopped
from asserting his claim; 3) Google's use fell under the "Fair Use" exception
to 17 U.S.C. § 107; and 4) Google's use fell under the safe harbor provision
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.7
Il. THE COURT'S REASONING
In finding that Google had not directly infringed on Field's copyrights,
the court emphasized the passive nature of Google's actions.8 It highlighted
that it was users, rather than Google itself, who requested and viewed the
material from Field's webpage.9 The court emphasized that Google simply
provided an automated service to users.' 0 Citing Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc.,"1 the court held
that "automated, non-volitional conduct ... in response to a user's request"
does not constitute direct infringement of an individual's copyright.12 Key to
the court's holding on this matter was the fact that, without the actions of
individual users requesting certain webpages, the alleged infringement would
never have occurred.13 Thus, Google's passive, automatic retrieval of infor-
mation only upon users' requests did not infringe on Field's copyrights since
4. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
5. A robots.txt file is a file commonly used in the webpage industry to give search
engines instructions on whether they may index a site. By using neither a ro-
bots.txt file nor an alterative method to alert search engines not to index his
site, Field wanted Google to index his site so that he would have a cause of
action for a lawsuit. See Google Webmaster Help Center-Remove your entire
website, http://www.google.com/remove.htm1.
6. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
7. Id. at 1109.
8. Id. at 1115.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Svcs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that infringement requires a volitional
act on the defendant's part, and not merely automated copying made at the
direction of others).




such automated actions could not be considered a "volitional" act on
Google's part.
Another important result of the court's analysis was the implied license
it found Field gave to Google. The court reasoned that since Field knew of
the technical methods of alerting search engines not to index his site and did
not utilize those methods, he had given Google an implied license for their
use. 14 As the court noted, Field was not simply a confused website owner
who had accidentally allowed search engines to index and cache his copy-
righted works; he actually knew about the technical solutions available to
instruct search engines not to index or cache his site, and yet, did nothing to
prevent them from doing so.15 In this way, Field knew that Google and other
search engines would index and cache his site and his silent acquiescence
reasonably led to the conclusion that Field gave them an implied license to
use his work for their search engine activities.16 The court also noted the
ease with which website owners could instruct search engines not to use their
site and highlighted the fact that such technical instructions were the industry
standard. 17
In accordance with its finding of an implied license, the court held that
Field was estopped from pursuing his claim against Google.18 The court
noted that: 1) Field knew of Google's use of his site; 2) he intended Google
to use his site and rely on his silent acquiescence to its indexing and caching;
3) Google did not know Field was trying to lure it into a trap; and 4) Google
relied to its detriment on Field's actions by indexing and caching his copy-
righted works.19 Thus, Field's bad faith was a key factor in finding that he
was estopped from asserting his copyright infringement claims The court
again highlighted the fact that if Field had used the aforementioned technical
methods to alert Google not to use his site, this dispute would never have
ended up in court.20
The most important and influential section of the court's reasoning re-
volved around its finding that Google's actions fell under the "Fair Use"
exception of the Copyright Act.21 The Fair Use exception to general copy-
right law "creates a limited privilege in those other than the owner of a copy-
right to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
14. Id. at 1116.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1112-13.
18. Id. at 1117.
19. Id. at 1118.
20. Id.
21. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1998).
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owner's consent"22 for such purposes as research, teaching, criticism, and
satire.23 Congress, in codifying the Fair Use Doctrine, listed four factors for
courts to use when determining whether a certain use falls under this
exception:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.24
In assessing the first factor, the court weighed heavily in favor of
Google, citing the highly "transformative" nature of its search engine activi-
ties as being dispositive.25 The court strongly emphasized the fact that
Google served "socially important purposes [and] 'benefited the public by
enhancing information-gathering techniques on the Internet.' "26 It noted that
while Field intended his works to serve artistic functions, the purposes of
Google's cached copies of these works were different, and did not merely
"supersede the objects of the original creation," but instead were transforma-
tive.27 The court highlighted several societal functions which Google's
cached copies provided: 1) allowing users to access an archival copy of a
website when the site is inaccessible; 2) allowing users to see whether
changes have been made to a site over time; and 3) highlighting users' search
terms within the cached page.28 In addition, Google's cached copies were
transformative in that they did not purport to replace the original copy of the
work.29 On the contrary, the court noted that every cached Google page had
conspicuous language at the top denoting the fact that the copy was merely a
22. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
23. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 107.
24. Id.
25. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
26. Id. at 1118 (quoting Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir.
2003)).
27. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))
(noting that "[tihe central purpose of this investigation is to see ... whether the
new use 'supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and
to what extent the new work is 'transformative.' ").
28. Id. at 1118-1119.
29. Id. at 1119.
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snapshot of the page, not a substitute for the contents of the actual
webpage.30
In analyzing the first factor, the court made important judgments regard-
ing the commercial nature of the work. Citing the Supreme Court's decision
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the court held that "where a use is
found to be transformative, the 'commercial' nature of the use is of less im-
portance in analyzing the first fair use factor."3' Furthermore, the court em-
phasized that while Google was a profit-making commercial entity, it did not
seek to profit directly from the cached copy of Field's work.32 Ultimately,
the court determined that Google's commercial status was of little impor-
tance in considering the first factor of the fair use analysis.33
The court similarly spent little time on the second factor-the nature of
the copyrighted work. While it noted that Field's poetry was "creative," it
pointed out that he had made his website free and open to the public.34 By
putting his works on a free website and not using technical methods to alert
Google not to cache his site, the court held that he freely opened his creative
works to the public. Thus, the second factor weighed only slightly in his
favor.35
Likewise, the court held that the third factor in the Fair Use analysis, the
amount and substantiality of the use, favored Google. Citing Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., the court observed that "the Supreme Court has
made clear that even copying of entire works should not weigh against a fair
use finding where the new use serves a different function from the original,
and the original work can be viewed by anyone free of charge."36 In addi-
tion, the court concluded that the purposes behind Google's cached copies of
webpages could not be accomplished by only copying portions of the web-
sites-a full copy of the website was necessary to be able to provide society
30. Id. (noting that each cached copy included a link to the original website and the
following message: "Google's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as
we crawled the web. The page may have changed since that time.").
31. Id. at 1119 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
32. Id. at 1120 (stressing that Google did not display any advertisements on the
cached copy of Field's site, and did not solicit business in any way through the




36. Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984)).
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with the full functions of Google's caching system.37 Thus, since a full copy
of the site was necessary, the court found that this factor was neutral.38
Again citing Sony Corp., the court found that the fourth fair use factor-
the effect of the use on the potential market for the work-weighed heavily
in Google's favor.39 The court emphasized that Field had intentionally
placed his works on a free website and that he had never tried to sell any of
his poetry. 40 Likewise, in response to Field's claim that he could have mar-
keted the rights to cache his site, the court noted that there was no market for
such caching rights and even major sites like Disney, ESPN, and others did
not receive compensation for the rights to cache their sites.41
In addition to the four statutory fair use factors, the court added its own
factor-whether the parties acted in good faith-to its analysis of the Fair
Use exception.42 The court emphasized the wide discrepancy between
Google's good faith and Field's attempts to lure the search engine into litiga-
tion.43 Google honored all requests by website owners not to index or cache
their site, and even devoted a portion of its own website to explaining how to
request non-inclusion in the index and caching system.a Likewise, Google
made a good faith effort to identify cached copies as simply "snapshots" of a
webpage while providing links to the actual webpage itself.45
Finally, the court also concluded that Google's cached copies fell under
the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.46 Field
claimed that Google's actions did not satisfy three areas of the safe harbor
provisions: 1) Google's cached copies did not constitute "intermediate and
temporary storage" under Section 512(b); 2) Google did not satisfy the re-
quirement under Section 512(b)(1)(B) "that the material in question be trans-
mitted from the person who posts the material online to another person at the
direction of the other person"; and 3) Google's cache did not satisfy the re-
37. Id. at 1121 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir.
2003)).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450) (explaining that "[a] use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted




42. Id. at 1121-22 (citing Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 107) (allowing
courts to consider other factors besides the four statutory fair use factors)).
43. Id. at 1123.
44. Id. at 1122; see also Google Webmaster Help Center-Removing my content
from the Google index, http://www.google.com/remove.html.




quirements of Section 512(b)(1)(C) that the storage be done through "an au-
tomated technical process" and be "for the purpose of making the material
available to users ... who request access to the material from the [originating
site]."47 The court, however, concluded that Google satisfied all three of
these requirements. Its cached copies, which were only retained for 14 to 20
days, were "temporary"; Field himself allowed Google's Googlebot to crawl
his website, satisfying Section 512(b)(1)(B)); and Google's cached copying
was certainly an "automated technical process" which was used to make in-
formation available to users who requested that information.48
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S REASONING
While certain areas of the court's analysis in Field were extremely ef-
fective and will have a positive impact on the progress of Internet-driven
culture, other areas of the court's reasoning left much to be desired with
respect to protecting the rights of copyright holders. Importantly, the court
discussed in great detail the transformative nature of Google's search engine
activities and highlighted the significance of those activities to the growth
and effectiveness of the Internet. The court's analysis correctly noted the
importance of search engines to our society and also broadened the scope of
acceptable services technology companies may provide to society. Likewise,
the court correctly held that Field gave Google an implied license to use his
website for indexing and caching purposes. The idea that website owners
give an implied license to search engines when they post material on the
Internet correctly aligned the court's analysis with the public policy favoring
the efficiency and effectiveness of information gathering on the Internet. Yet
the court failed to protect some of the legitimate interests of copyrights hold-
ers by not defining standards for the first and fourth Fair Use factors. As a
result, the court left many questions open for future cases.
In analyzing the first Fair Use factor, the court correctly emphasized the
transformative nature of Google's search engine activities and opened the
way for other highly beneficial services of this kind, such as the Google
Library Project, to proceed. This analysis was important for the continued
growth of the Internet as a key part of society's information super-highway.
The court correctly emphasized the importance of search engines in daily
life, noting that limiting their functions by rigidly construing copyright laws
would hinder society's technological growth. The access search engines pro-
vide is increasingly important not only for helping individuals make better
choices and stay connected, but also to protect the freedoms of information-
gathering that digital-age users expect.49 This decision also made great
47. Id. at 1124.
48. Id.
49. Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8
YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006), available at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/
yjolt/files/200520061ssue/springO6-gasser.pdf ("Access in the sense of access
2007]
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strides in setting a broad standard for other socially beneficial Internet ser-
vices such as Google's own Library Project. Similar to the societal value of
search engines, Google's Library Project contributes to society by giving
users access to a searchable database of an enormous collection of the
world's foremost literary works.50 As Hannibal Travis noted, however, just
like other major societal initiatives such as highways and railroad systems,
the vital functions of search engines and the potential of the Google Library
Project could be derailed by individuals who seek a rigid application of ex-
isting laws to favor themselves at society's expense.51 Therefore, the court's
emphasis on the societal benefits of search engines solidified the public's
interest in maintaining open access to digital information.
Likewise, the court's holding that Field's actions had given Google an
implied license to use his works was important in setting a broad standard for
search engines. Its analysis implies that once a copyright holder puts his
works on a free website and does nothing to alert search engines not to use
those works, his material is freely available for search engines and others to
use in transformative, socially beneficial ways.52 Such a conclusion allows
Google and other search engines broad powers to continue their current in-
dexing and caching. This ruling is consistent with public policy allowing
search engines and other valuable services to utilize the full power of the
Internet to aid society when doing so would not offend the express wishes of
individual copyright holders.53 Such a policy protects the socially-important
functions of search engines and other transformative activities, while also
protecting assiduous copyright holders who take the necessary steps to opt-
out of this implied license theory.54 Furthermore, this policy fits with the
everyday realities of the Internet, where reasonable users understand that
whatever they post on the Internet is accessible and usable by anyone with a
to search infrastructure is crucial for users, because it is the prerequisite for the
... freedom to efficiently and effectively make choices among alternative sets
of ideas, information, and opinions in the digital age.").
50. See Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 2
PLAGIARY: CROss-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN PLAGIARISM, FABRICATION, AND
FALSIFICATION 1, 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.plagiary.org/Google-
Library-Project.pdf.
51. See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for
Copyright Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 786 (2006).
52. See Daniel Holevoet & Sarah Price, Copyright Reform for the Digital Age: A
Closer Look at Google (Spring 2006) (unpublished Graduate presentation, Yale
University), available at http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs457/.
53. Id. at 22 (proposing that all information posted on the Internet carry an implied
license for its use in the absence of technical steps taken by the copyright
holder to prevent such use).
54. Id. at 24.
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computer and Internet access.55 At the same time, the idea that copyright
holders should be forced to take affirmative steps to opt-out of a socially
beneficial use of their work also seemingly opens the door for other socially
beneficial projects such as the Google Library Project. If website owners
have to opt out of search engine indexing and caching, should book publish-
ers not also be required to take the easy steps to opt-out of socially beneficial,
transformative projects like the Google Library Project if they do not want
their works used in that way?56
Although the court conducted a thorough analysis of the transformative
nature of search engines and the issue of implied licenses, it failed to set such
broad standards in other areas of its analysis, most notably in its discussion
of the first and fourth Fair Use factors. In addressing the first factor, the
court correctly decided that search engine activities were transformative and
beneficial to society; however it spent too little time discussing the reasons
why the commercial nature of Google's enterprise was negated by its trans-
formative functions. The court correctly recognized that Google's cached
copies, which did not include any advertisements or solicit business from
users in any way, exhibited little, if any, commercial tendencies. This ruling
that the transformative nature of use outweighs the indirect commercial bene-
fits from a cached copy is supported by the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Campbell.57 This analysis, however, fails to establish when commercial ac-
tivities outweigh a use's transformative nature, or even factors in determining
this balancing test. Such precedent without further explanation could have
broad impacts on technology law, as it implies that the transformative nature
of the work will often and easily outweigh other, more intrusive commercial
methods of using another's copyrighted work. Without a set of factors for
determining when commercial activities outweigh transformative use, copy-
55. See Employers Look at Facebook, Too, June 20, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2006/06/20/eveningnews/main1734920.shtml (noting the ever-
growing phenomenon of employers looking at interviewees Facebook profiles
to discern the character of the potential employee, even where interviewees do
not give permission to do so).
56. Evidence suggests that requiring Google to find every copyright holder of
every book they digitize, as well as negotiate with them for the rights to digi-
tize, would completely destroy the financial viability of this project. See Band,
supra note 50, at 9 (estimating that transaction costs for finding copyright hold-
ers would exceed $25 billion, and would cause Google to either scrap the Li-
brary Project or not digitize a large number of works); see also Travis, supra
note 51, at 836 (noting that unlike public projects like highways, where offi-
cials only have to deal with a small number of property owners in negotiating
property rights, digital libraries would be required to negotiate with millions of
intellectual property rights holders in an opt-in system).
57. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (2007) (holding
that "the more transformative the new work, the less important the other fac-
tors, including commercialism, become").
2007]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
right holders are left to wonder whether their materials will be wildly ex-
ploited by profit-driven enterprises in the future.
In analyzing the fourth Fair Use factor, the impact of the use on the
potential market for the work, the court similarly failed to make any judg-
ments to help define this factor for the future. While the court correctly
noted that large website owners do not make money off the right to cache
their sites, the court merely dismissed the notion that Field's works held ac-
tual or potential economic value without making any determinations which
might help for future cases. The court's ruling in Field suggests that a copy-
right holder must show a more immediate, actual market for his works, and at
the very least, a present intention to market the works in the future. Such a
rule would deprive many copyright holders of their rights in the initial stages
of their works' acceptance and would have broad ranging implications for
other transformative initiatives like Google's Library Project. For example,
this ruling suggests that if the copyright holder of a book can show no defina-
ble current market for his book or present intention to market the book in the
future, Google is free to digitize that work for its searchable library database.
It is estimated that the percentage of copyrighted but out-of-print books in
university libraries could constitute as many as 65% of those libraries' hold-
ings. When coupled with the estimated 15% that are part of the public do-
main, the ruling in Field might freely open 80% of the holdings of libraries
up to Google for digitization.58
In addition, the court's analysis of the fourth Fair Use factor leaves out
the possibility that search engine activities actually promote and benefit the
market for a copyrighted work. The Ninth Circuit, in Kelly, suggested that
search engine activities might actually benefit the market for a work and that
such a benefit to the work's market should be factored into the court's analy-
sis. 59 Yet the court in Field failed to recognize that a search engine might
benefit the market for a copyrighted work, thus leaving this question unan-
swered for future cases. Adopting the Ninth Circuit's view, which allows the
benefits of a transformative use on the market as a factor in the analysis,
would have aided initiatives like the Google Library Project, which many
concede has the potential to benefit the marketing of large numbers of out-of-
print books.60 By declining to consider beneficial use as a factor in the anal-
ysis, the court in Field failed to take an opportunity to further solidify its
58. Hal Varian, The Google Library Project 5 (Feb. 24, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script prepared for the AEI-Brookings discussion), available at http://www.
ischool.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/2006/google-library.pdf.
59. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003).
60. See Band, supra note 50, at 5 (suggesting that Google's searchable database of
digital books may increase the market for many books by showing users the
relevance of those books and guiding them to such books); see also Varian,
supra note 58, at 12 (quoting the President of the American Association of
Publishers as saying "Google Print Library could help many authors get more
exposure and maybe even sell more books...").
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position that transformative uses of copyrighted works should be broadly
protected in today's modern society.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Field correctly decided the issues at hand, and in so doing,
laid a groundwork for copyright law in the Internet age which will have
broad implications for the future. Its analysis of search engines' transforma-
tive natures, as well as its discussion of implied licenses, establishes the
foundation for future rulings and solidifies these important standards in copy-
right law. Finally, the Field ruling preserves the important functions which
search engines provide for society, and may have implications for other
transformative Internet initiatives as well.

